The Architecture of Governance

Part One: The Four Fragmentations

The most serious design problem facing the world's cities is the design of their governance system. Without an effective governance regime, no idea for city improvement – no proposal for transportation, housing, sustainability, economic development, education, crime control or any other urban issue – can be implemented. These days, implementation frustration is the most prevalent urban disease. Why can't we get anything done? Or, worse, why can we get some things done – often the wrong things – while other, more important issues go unaddressed?

These are the topics I want to discuss both tonight and, next year, in London. We should start with recognizing that cities' governance systems are part of our built environment. There is nothing natural about them. We build governance systems – and, once built, these systems help determine what our cities are like every bit as much as their location, buildings, landscape, and economic vitality. Winston Churchill's oft-quoted remark – first we shape our buildings then they shape us – needs to be extended further out: First we shape our cities then they shape us. This way of putting it raises some immediate questions. Who are the "we" who shape our governance systems? And what kind of governance system are we shaping? Most importantly, what kind of governance systems should we be shaping? To help us think through these issues, I want to argue tonight that we should think of the construction of governance systems as a form of architecture – as the design of a structure. As in architecture, this undertaking requires creativity and flexibility. It is a controversial, context-sensitive intervention into urban life. It is also a practice that is deeply located in the larger society and, at the same time, it helps create what that society is.

This stance toward governance should make clear why I've entitled my talk the architecture of governance. To introduce this topic, I need to say a few words about what I mean by governance and what I mean by architecture. By governance, I am referring to the rules that determine who has power to solve any of the problems now engendered by city life. I'm not talking about the content of any particular solution or any particular problem. Too many people in urban studies think of governance and law only in terms of zoning and land use. My focus is broader. Thinking about the governance system requires us to ask: who has the power to determine what the zoning rules are? And, equally importantly, who has the power to frame the rules that govern education, economic development, policing, water delivery, transportation, sanitation, and countless other ingredients of city life? The level of inquiry I'm seeking, if you know the book, is similar to the one that Kevin Lynch adopted in his book Good City Form. It's an attempt to speak about governance in a way that is general enough, yet meaningful enough, to apply to the incredible variety of cities across

the globe. Lynch's book attempts to do this focusing on what cities should look like. I plan to discuss instead the way we allocate the governmental power that determines who can answer his question.

In most of the world's cities, this authority is now allocated to a variety of different kinds of institutions. Some issues are controlled by city neighborhoods, like the arrondisements here in Montreal; others are in the hands of the city government; others still in the hands of a regional authority, like the Montreal Metropolitan Community. Many more are determined by a state or province, such as the Province of Quebec, and more still are in the hands of the national government. But this is only the beginning.   Across the world, many important issues are now decided not by these kinds of public institutions but by quasi-independent public authorities or quangos, such as the Metropolitan Transportation Agency here. Others have been allocated to vague arrangements called public-private partnerships and community benefit agreements, and still others are being decided by initiatives and referenda. Elements of this fragmentation exist everywhere that I know. In each of these cities, the fragmentation creates problems of conflict, dysfunction, gaps in coverage, overlap, and debilitating complexity. "Architecture," Rem Koolhaas has said, "is a poisonous mixture of power and impotence." That definition applies even more to current governance systems. No one would create the system that now exists in any city that I've studied starting from scratch. Yet every one of these systems is man-made. Somebody created it, and somebody can change it. No doubt, everywhere, change is hard. But for change to be possible, we need to figure out what a city's current governance system is and what it should be.

This brings us to architecture. If, at the most basic level, architecture deals with the design and fabrication of structures, I think of governance as a particular kind of structure. Of course, a governance system is not a building. But like the design of a building, a properly designed governance system should ensure that each of its ingredients is thought about in a relationship to the structure as a whole. This means not just the relationship between city government and its neighborhoods – or the surface of a building and the inside – but the relationship between any particular structure and the other structures that exist both nearby and within the wider political community. Connecting governance and architecture highlights something else as well: the relationship between form and function. The idea that form follows function is even more widespread in the governance world than it is in architecture. In architecture, the critique of this idea has been well articulated – both by people who want to emphasize art and aesthetics and by those who stress the political and the social. But the analogous critique is not as well developed in governance design. People are obsessed almost exclusively with whether a government institution "works" and, if so, whether it works efficiently. Other considerations – above all, democratic accountability – have therefore taken a back seat. Besides, the notion of a function is ambiguous. Obviously, in governance as in architecture, any structure should be able to perform the tasks assigned to it. But over time

the world changes and the functions that have to be performed change with it. Governance systems, like buildings, need to be retrofitted as old functions decline in importance and new ones arise. Doing so requires inventing new forms, and, in that process, it becomes clear that there are lots of forms that can perform the same function.

One final connection between governance and architecture seems worth mentioning. For both architecture and governance, no design is solely the task of experts. The dream – or nightmare – of an architect alone controlling design has long ago faded. Many others – clients, the community, the government – must be accommodated. So too with the design of a governance system. For governance designers, the people who live in the territory being governed might be thought of as the clients. But others – higher-level governments, business interests, politicians – have to be listened to as well. There is no escaping from the political nature of the design process for either architecture or governance. Of course, governance systems do not have an architect in the conventional sense of the term. But the people who design governance systems can be analogized to architects. Who are these designers? Their identity is absolutely clear: Depending on the country, they are either state or provincial legislators (as in the United States and Canada) or members of the national legislature (as in the UK). These legislators are the people – circumscribed, to be sure, like architects, by others in the society, but nevertheless powerful -- who determine what the governance structure looks like. These are the people who should be held responsible for the current system. These are the people who can change it. When you walk around town with architects, they will point to a building and name the architect responsible for it. We should do the same with governance systems. We should have a plaque with the names of those responsible. Of course, the upkeep and retrofitting of the governance structure is in the hands of different individuals than the original designers. But the same is true of architects – new people come in to redo and update what their predecessors have built.

Enough has now been said, I hope, about the general connection between governance and architecture. I now want to devote the rest of this lecture to spelling out what we can learn from this connection. I begin with the first and most basic design issue for a governance system: defining the role of democracy in governance. Many people here probably think that it is obvious that cities should be democratically governed. But there is nothing obvious about it. In my opinion, belief in democracy is decreasing around the world, even – I am tempted to say especially – in the most democratic countries on the planet. What seems better at the moment is either some form of privatization or some form of authoritarianism. By privatization I mean not just the transfer, by contract or sale, of governmental authority to a private institution. I include the much more prevalent use of quasi-independent public authorities, public-private partnerships, community benefit agreements, and referenda or initiatives. All of these kinds of arrangements seek to limit the influence of elected governments in the decision-making process. By authoritarianism, I refer to what I'll call China-Envy. Many

people now think: Hey, you know, in China, they can really get things done. And not just in China; Singapore too. Here, everything is tied up forever. There, they are transforming their cities overnight. To get something done, we ought to organize our cities the way they run Shanghai or Singapore.

There's no point trying to spell out how to organize a democratically-responsive governance system -- my ultimate task -- if we don't first put aside these instincts to limit democracy in the name of privatization or authoritarianism. Tonight, I will address this topic. In London, I intend to talk about the architecture of democratic governance itself. I suspect, however, you will feel cheated if I don't talk at least a little about democracy tonight. The hunger for ideas about organizing democratically-responsive governance systems is too intense for me to ignore. I'm therefore planning to end this talk with a brief account of the democratic alternative to privatization and authoritarianism – an account that I will offer in much more detail in London.

Let's turn, then, to the question for tonight: Why is it that governance systems around the world are such a mess? I intend to answer this question by discussing what I will call the Four Fragmentations. I'm hoping my Four Fragmentations slogan will vaguely remind everyone of Mao Zedong and his Four Olds: old ideas, old culture, old customs, old habits. My four categories are different. Dealing with them requires no revolution, cultural or otherwise. What it requires is legislative reform. The four fragmentations I have in mind fracture government authority by empowering the decision makers I've already mentioned: public authorities, public-private partnerships, community benefit agreements, and initiatives or referenda. The four fragmentations can therefore be divided into four types. Fragmentation occurs by dividing authority by function; by separating the public from the private; by allocating power to different territorially-defined jurisdictions; and by relying on direct rather than representative democracy. I'm now going to go through these four fragmentations one at time. All of them need to be addressed to make our governance systems work better.

Let's start with functional fragmentation. My example of this form will be public authorities. The reason that public authorities are created – I mean housing authorities, port authorities, transportation authorities, redevelopment authorities, water authorities, and countless others – is to take decision making power out of the hands of elected officials. Authorities are publicly-created corporations. They put decision making power in the hands of an appointed board of directors that, by law, has considerable independence from elected officials. Often, these kinds of institutions are every bit as important – sometimes more important – than the city government in making urban policy. Who are these decision makers and why do we trust them? It's not an adequate answer to call them experts. Many people appointed to these bodies are not experts. And experts, when we need them, can easily work for elected officials. What's attractive about these institutions is that the legal system gives them a kind of

flexibility that is denied elected governments. They can pay their officials more, they can operate across city lines, they can issue debt that is outside the city's debt limit, and they can make decisions in a way that is more insulated from popular control. These advantages are seductive. Whenever an issue arises that needs attention – like, say, rebuilding the World Trade Center site in New York after 9/11 – the first instinct to create an authority, like the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation, to deal with it.

As a result, there are many different authorities in major cities, and these authorities do not need to coordinate either with the elected government or with each other. As they multiply, it becomes harder and harder to formulate any sensible, overall government policy – for example, a policy for the development of lower Manhattan. It seems fair to say that no one would organize a building's construction in such a fragmented way. Obviously, any building, like any city, requires expert specialists to make it operate effectively. But when one constructs a building there is an overall plan on how the parts fit together. There needs to be an overall plan for governance too. This is not to say that a central decision maker should decide everything. Allowing subcomponents to have flexibility and specialization is a good thing in governance as in architecture. The design problem in any kind of organization -- in a business corporation as much as in a construction project or governance design -- involves figuring out how to enable coordination while still ensuring that each of the specialists can profit from their own knowledge and experience. Figuring out how to do this is not easy anywhere, and I'll have more to say about this task later. For the moment, it's enough to say that no decentralized system can allow some of its components to be simply on their own, independent not only from an overall plan but from the other components as well. This, then, is first element in the needed reform of governance: current public authorities need to be brought within the control of elected government. In fact, some of them should be abolished altogether.

The second fragmentation involves the public/private distinction. This element can most easily be understood by looking at the current popular romance with public-private partnerships. These days many people define "governance" to mean public-private partnerships. Governance, they say, involves people they call "stakeholders" getting together around what always is called "a table" and, then, through consensus building, coming up with a public policy. This is claimed to be the modern way of exercising public power, with the old term – what people used to call government – falling into disrepute. Advocates of public-private partnerships envision government as just one of the relevant stakeholders in the formulation of public policy. Who are the others? We know that powerful members of the business community are likely to be included in the term; chances are, some interest groups will be included as well. But we also know that ordinary people – plain old citizens – are not likely to be at the table. Yet it is these citizens who elect their government. In a democracy, corporations and interests groups don't have a vote; only individuals vote. A

consensus rule for public-private partnerships thus gives a veto power over governmental policy to people who are not part of the electorate.

What is the alternative to public-private partnerships? It can't be some notion that the government should decide everything by itself. No one thinks that. To do anything, government has to work with other parts of society: developers, business leaders, community activists, non-governmental institutions, campaign donors – to name just a few. Even authoritarian governments have limits on what they can do without the cooperation of these kinds of people. The issue raised by public-private partnerships is not whether the public sector – government – needs to work with the private sector. Of course it does. The issue instead is defining how the public sector is organized. Government has to have its own authority and responsibilities. No private interest should have a veto power over governmental policy. Certainly no veto power should be given to the handful of people who are chosen, often in unaccountable ways, to sit at the table. Not every partnership deal arranged between the government and private interests is a good one. After all, corruption is a form of public-private partnership. The design problem raised by public-private partnerships, to be blunt, is determining how to prevent the private capture of government policy.

To prevent this capture, it is necessary to define what the role of the public is. This too is not an easy task. But we can start with Kevin Lynch's description of the role of planning in defining the physical form of the city. Lynch puts aside the traditional focus in planning circles on land use questions alone. He turns instead to what he calls planning's "special interest." Planning, he says, is in favor of five things:

> the long-term effects, the interests of the absent client, the construction of new possibilities, the explicit use of values, and the ways of informing and opening up the decision process.

Not a bad beginning definition of the public interest. Not a bad definition of the kind of elements that should not be compromised at the public-private table. Sure, Lynch's list is just a beginning; it needs to be rethought and revised. But it is enough to allow us to state the aspect of governance reform highlighted by the current reliance on public-private partnerships: we need to identify and strengthen a role for the public, not just in any public-private negotiations or partnership but in governance decision making more generally.

Let's turn next to territorial fragmentation. I'm going to postpone until London talking about the most obvious example of this fragmentation – the division of power among local, regional, state and national governments. Here, because of their importance in architectural and planning practice, I'm going to focus instead on community benefit agreements. Community benefit agreements derive from the fact that it has become conventional in architectural projects to

require consultations with the community. Increasingly, these consultations result in an agreement -- a community benefit agreement – that allows the project to be built without opposition in exchange for providing specified benefits to the community.

Community benefit agreements probably seem very different than the fragmentation along either functional or public/private lines. The reason is the use of another romantic term: this time, not "partnership" but "community." In community benefit agreements, it is often said, it is the people who speak. Community benefit agreements allow ordinary people to gain power over experts, developers, and bureaucrats. But who represents the "community" in a community benefit agreement? The answer is almost always interests groups and individuals in the immediate neighborhood. At first blush, these seem to be the right people: aren't they the ones most affected? But concentrating so exclusively on the immediate neighborhood is also odd. Neighborhoods have no institutional power in public decision making in most cities around the world. Borough or district governments cover more territory, and, of course, so do cities, regions, and states. These larger, more inclusive, entities are the ones that are usually empowered to make public policy. There is a reason for this. Neighborhoods can be very parochial. What's good for a neighborhood may not be good for the city as a whole. Besides, who can speak for a neighborhood – indeed, speak so authoritatively that they can prevent lawsuits that would otherwise tie up a project? Building projects are designed to change neighborhoods. New residents will arrive and old ones will be forced out. The benefits negotiated in any agreement might not be the ones that the new residents -- or even the current residents -- want. Those purporting to represent the community may be demanding too much, seeking the wrong things, or selling out. Yet these agreements are often made privately, as they are in New York, without the kind of public hearing and scrutiny usually required for public decision making.

It should come as no surprise that there is increasing opposition to these community benefit agreements. A recent report by the New York Bar Association urged the city government to disregard these agreements when making city policy. But this opposition can be taken too far. Neighborhoods have good reason to think that city governments are not responsive to them. They do need a voice in the governing process. The design problem for governance is figuring how to allow them to be heard while, at the same time, ensuring that the larger constituency – the borough, the city, the region, the state – is heard as well. The design problem, in other words, is determining the size of the group empowered to frame public policy. The slogan "We should be able to control our own destiny" can be voiced at every territorial level: the street, the immediate neighborhood, the district, the city, the region, the state, the nation. Each of these units can be understood as representing the wishes of the people. Community benefit agreements are simply one of many examples of efforts to separate out one of these territorial slices as if it were the most important one.

But they all have a role to play. Most of my talk in London will focus on how one organizes a democratic governance system to confront this problem of territorial fragmentation. I'll say a word about this at the end here too.

The fourth and final fragmentation I will discuss is the division between popular and representative government. I am referring here to the increasing reliance on a popular vote – through an initiative or referendum – as the preferred way of making public policy. In the United States, California has become the poster-child for this form of decision making. For thirty years, popular votes have controlled significant parts of the government agenda. They have, for example, limited the government's ability to raise revenue and, at the same time, mandated that it spend money for specific public purposes. It is no surprise that this simultaneous limit on income and mandate of expenses has created paralysis. You couldn't operate a business or your own life if you couldn't balance income and expenses. Once your income started going down and your expenses started going up, you'd be on the ropes. This is the situation now in the State of California. In California, many government policies, not just fiscal matters, are resolved this way. And California is by no means exceptional. More than 100 countries, and half the American states, have embraced the initiative process. In some countries, although not in the United States, there are popular votes at the national level. This occurred in some European countries, for example, when dealing with the proposed revision of the European Union treaty. In fact, the recent Lisbon Treaty has created a transnational initiative procedure, called the European Initiative Process; its implementation is now being worked out.

It might seem odd to you that I have categorized the initiative as a form of privatization. The initiative has long been heralded as the opposite – as the true expression of democracy. That's why it is generally been referred to as "direct democracy." It is, however, a particular kind of democracy. Initiatives, usually written by interest groups, are often badly drafted and hard to implement. Whether they pass is often affected by the amount of money available to the two sides. Worse still, in the initiative process, unlike in the legislative process, there is no mechanism that engages every decision maker in a debate about the issue before the vote, no process that allows amendments based on the information generated by the debate, no process that allows negotiation between the two sides, no process that ensures that the issue being decided is put in the context of other demands on government. Ordinary people are asked for an up or down vote on a matter of great complexity. And they vote on the issue privately, in the isolation of the voting booth, with a secret ballot, without having to account to anyone for why they are voting the way they are.

The splitting of issues between direct and representative democracy means that no one is in control of the governance system. Elected officials are unable to solve problems because initiatives have closed off many possible courses of action. In California, for example, some initiatives amend the state

constitution and for that reason are not subject to legislative reconsideration. Indeed, in California, quite unusually, every initiative, even a statute, can only be amended by another popular vote. Some of the state's initiatives have also required supra-majority votes in the legislature to pass certain kinds of legislation, thereby decreasing legislative flexibility even further. The impact of this structure is that the government is unable to confront the state's problems. Not everyone thinks that this is a bad thing. Initiatives are often not designed to get things done. One of the reasons people insist on a popular vote is to curb the government's authority. Even those who want government to work often vote in a way that has the opposite effect. People afraid of taxes will vote against school funding, even if they have kids in school, because they think there's already enough money in the budget for education although there isn't.

There is only one way out of this fragmentation. Coordination of government activity cannot be handled through popular votes. Each vote is on a single issue. Sometimes, contradictory positions on the same issue are voted in the same election. There's no way one can run a government through a series of separate popular votes. The only place where control can be lodged is in the elected legislature. Giving the legislature control does not mean abolishing initiatives and referenda. They can still be useful on certain issues. But they have to be brought within a governance system. This means giving more power to the legislature in designing the process. The Swiss way to do so is allow constitutional change only if a majority not just of the nation but also of each of the provinces – the cantons – approve. The Swiss also do not allow national financial legislation to be the subject of a popular vote. Others propose empowering the legislature to amend or repeal initiative-sponsored legislation, perhaps by a supra-majority vote. No one should think that elected officials would lightly go against the vote of the people.

The problem with this reform proposal, you will recognize, is that it fails to acknowledge the reasons for the current popularity of the initiative. This enthusiasm is generated by the distrust of elected government. Some of this distrust has to do with real problems with the legislative process. But some of it also has to do with the ways in which the initiative process has contributed to legislative dysfunction. This dysfunction feeds distrust, and the resulting distrust feeds the enthusiasm for initiatives that exacerbate the dysfunction. The same vicious circle, I suggest, applies to the other three fragmentations as well. It is the distrust of representative government that leads to the reliance not just on popular votes but on public authorities, public-private partnerships, and community benefit agreements. If government were more trusted, there would be less opposition to bringing independent authorities under its control. If government were more trusted, there would be less desire to add other so-called stakeholders to the public decision making process. If government were more trusted, neighborhoods could rely on it to make a sensible deal with developers, thereby diminishing the need for community benefit agreements. All four

fragmentations contribute to the ineffectiveness of democratic government, thereby helping generate the lack of confidence in it.

We need to undercut this destructive dynamic. One essential ingredient in this task – the one I've emphasized tonight – is overcoming the kinds of fragmentation that now frustrate the implementation of public policy. We need to enable democratically elected government to oversee and coordinate public policy. If this doesn't happen, the quality of democratic government won't matter, because policy will be made by other kinds of institutions. By itself, however, addressing the four fragmentations will not restore trust in government. For that, we need to focus specifically on the structure of democratic government itself. If its structure were improved, the desire for public authorities and the reliance on stakeholders and popular votes is likely to diminish. So would China-envy. People who find authoritarianism attractive like it because it prevents fragmentation by putting someone in charge. In China the Communist Party at the national level is in charge. Of course, fans of authoritarianism here don't have the Communist Party in mind. But they do imagine some kind of overall boss. What they want is a Robert Moses for every city in the world. The reason we need so many avatars of Robert Moses, the argument runs, is that, without them, nothing can be done.

I'm not a fan of authoritarianism. The romance of authoritarianism leaves out its dark side. China certainly can get things done. But it has a problem <u>not</u> getting things done. Democratic societies have an ability to stop projects – highways that shouldn't be built, the destruction of historic neighborhoods, the imprisonment of innocent people – that authoritarian societies do not have. And there is something even more fundamental. The strength of a democratic society lies in its ability to draw on the initiative, creativity, and energy of a wide variety of people and not just a few people at the top. The importance of this kind of decentralized initiative is usually celebrated by those who defend the free market against a government-controlled economy. But, as Tocqueville pointed out in Democracy in America, the same point applies to structures of governance. The governance system, as much as the market system, needs to be organized to maximize the initiative and creativity generated by decentralization. Those who would like to see China succeed – and I'm in that group – worry that its current governance design undermines this essential strength.

Instead of embracing authoritarianism or continuing to fragment decision making authority, we should reallocate our energy into putting democratic government in charge of public policy. This requires improving how democratic government operates. I intend to devote my talk in London to a discussion of this reform. I promised at the outset that I'd give you a sneak preview of what I'll say there. This account will be brief, but hopefully, it will give you a glimpse of the idea. I plan to start by insisting that we should not substitute a romance with the word "democracy" for our romance with words like "stakeholders" and "community." Building a democratic government is not the naïve idea that the

opinion polls of the moment should become government policy. Too much of this naïve idea now feeds the initiative process – and, indeed, many of our elections. Democratic government is a structure, and the process of creating it should be thought of in the way an architect thinks of a building's design. Each structure has to be considered in its own context. Each has to take account of the history and current social environment of the location where the structure is to be placed. Each structure has to ensure that its parts fit together both internally and with the other structures that surround it. And each structure has to be able to be retrofitted as the society changes. Building a democratic structure is a creative process. There is no one model for democratic government for every city in the world.

I do think it will be helpful, however, as Kevin Lynch thought for the physical form for cities, for me to suggest in London some general ideas to be considered in this construction process. There are many ingredients in the current loss of faith in democratic government. There's the role of money in politics that affects both the quality of people we elect and the kind of decisions they make; there's the increased role of celebrity, rather than knowledge about public issues, in political campaigns; there's the pervasive lack of faith in any kind of collective effort to create a better common life for ourselves. In London, I will concentrate, as I have here, on only one of these ingredients: the architecture of democratic governance. National governments, state governments, regional governments, city governments, borough governments, and neighborhood organizations all now make critical public policy decisions. But none of the current ideas about how to allocate power to these different levels of government -- concepts like federalism, subsidiarity, and local autonomy -- has helped to organize them in an effective way.

To better connect these levels of government, we need to start at the most basic level, the neighborhood. Increasing confidence in democratic government is most likely to work if it is connected very closely to one's own life – if it allows ordinary citizens to participate in creating the environment in which they live. This can only happen at the local level. But neighborhoods cannot have the final word. My emphasis on the importance of neighborhoods should not be understood as the opposite of organizing government top-down. The higher level of governments now have authority – and should continue to have authority -- over lower levels of government. Neighborhood decisions need to be coordinated by the city, just like city decisions need to be coordinated by the state, and state decisions need to be coordinated by the nation. We have to stop talking as if the choice in government design were between top-down and bottom-up. Democratic governance has to be top-down and bottom-up simultaneously. We need to focus not on choosing between these alternatives but on creating the right relationship between the various levels of government. The design problem is to ensure that each of the higher levels of government is responsive to the ones below them.

This is not a new idea. In fact, it is currently the reigning theory of democracy. In many cities, local officials are elected district by district. And it is traditional for state and national legislatures to be made up of people elected locally too. The traditional idea of what a city, state, and nation <u>are</u>, in other words, is that they are controlled locally. At the moment, however, this structure does not effectively allow either the exercise of decentralized power or adequate coordination of different localities. We need to design a better structure. In London, I will offer some thoughts about how this might be done. I will discuss ideas – in particular ideas from the South African constitution – about how the interdependence of different levels of authority can be conceptualized. And I will discuss in detail a specific form for a regional organization made of the region's cities, one that would both enable coordination and empower local decision making on a metropolitan-wide basis. Even without hearing about these proposals in detail, I'm sure you will recognize that the need to coordinate and decentralize at the same time is not unique to government. All organizations have this need. Lessons can therefore be learned from other kinds of large-scale organizations – business corporations and universities and non-profits. And lessons can be learned from architecture as well. No architectural project can allow parts of the undertaking to be autonomous, but no project can be completely controlled by central decision making either.

There is another ingredient in democratic reform that I will discuss in London that I would like to close by mentioning here: the role of experts. Democratic governance should not be understood as the opposite of expertise. At the same time, a government run by experts is not democratic. What's needed is an institutional structure in which experts can help inform democratic decision making without controlling it. Even now the governance system invokes the promise of both democracy and expertise. But it does so by fragmenting the structure, not by integrating it. My reference to expertise should remind you of the current reliance on public authorities. And my reference to democracy should remind you of the temptations of community control and popular votes. To integrate these two sources of authority, we, like architects, have to build something that can accommodate conflicting goals. We can do better than we are doing now to construct such an architecture of democracy. We have to do better, because both privatization and authoritarianism are waiting in the wings.